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Abstract
There is a gap of twenty-four centuries between us and the Greek philosopher 
Plato. But what he had to say about illness, healing and the human being can be 
unexpectedly relevant in contemporary medical ethics. We argue that the con-
temporary principles of autonomy and beneficence can be revisited by means of 
platonic philosophy. We present an old and consistent idea of care which includes 
the empowerment of people in choosing the good by means of a virtuous character. 
We connect this idea to the contemporary notion of autonomy. We also show how a 
holistic approach was present for a long time in our cultural history. We argue that, 
despite its almost definitive loss, holism can and should be present in revisiting the 
principle of beneficence. For both holism and care, we provide samples of philo-
sophical history. We conclude that an autonomous choice should be revisited as a 
wise choice and that medical beneficence should be reconsidered as holistic.
Keywords: Plato, autonomy, beneficence, care, holism
1. Introduction
Connecting the ancient philosopher Plato with contemporary medical ethics 
seems a bold endeavor. However, such a connection is relevant and useful. Many 
of the contemporary medical ethics’ problems stem from how we define life, 
choices, beneficence and similar difficult notions. And, throughout history, the 
various implicit definitions of such notions have changed. Therefore, how human 
life was philosophically understood from one era to another had an impact on the 
practice of medicine. From the magical medicine of the XVIIIth century B.C. until 
the contemporary evidence-based medicine, the way of acting with respect to an 
illness, to the body and to the human being has changed [1, 2]. There is, however, 
one especially relevant nexus of ideas in history, with respect to how we understand 
life, healing and what it is to be human. This work gathers older and important ideas 
from its past but also serves as an influential philosophy for the whole subsequent 
way of Western thinking. These ideas are important now, because tracing back some 
crucial elements of our cultural DNA can provide valuable insights to the contem-
porary struggles of medical ethics. Such philosophical nexus is Plato. His Dialogs 
are ingrained with two key implicit notions that are essential to medicine: holism 
and care. We try to trace back these two implicit notions and to connect them to the 
contemporary principles of autonomy and beneficence. In summary, we explore 
what Plato can unexpectedly teach us when it comes to solving current bioethical 
issues.
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2. Contemporary autonomy and the platonic therapeia
The precise meaning of “autonomy” in contemporary biomedical ethics is still 
in dispute. A minimal definition of autonomy includes a self-governance, free from 
both the controlling influence of others and free from any other form of interfer-
ence that would prevent a meaningful choice. Such an interference would be, for 
instance, an incomplete understanding or some type of coercion. For many con-
temporary bioethicists, an autonomous person is one who acts freely in line with a 
plan of their choosing. On the other hand, a person with diminished autonomy is, in 
some significant respect, controlled by other people or unable to deliberate and act 
based on their own plans and desires. Almost all theories of “autonomy” consider 
two crucial prerequisites. One of them is freedom, and the other is agency or ability 
to act with intent [3]. Autonomy includes both the capacity to distinguish between 
alternatives and the capacity to put one’s plan into action [4]. There is no mention 
about the nature of what the patient is about to choose.
But, the way Plato understood the meaningful choice is intriguing. This is 
because the philosopher reveals two ways of doing something one “wants” in his 
Dialogs. One type is doing something that seems good for a person’s opinion or in 
line with appearances. The other one is doing something a person genuinely wants. 
The difference lies in pursuing the good or pursuing the mere pleasure or appear-
ance. The passage in Gorgias1 is obvious: “For I say, Polus, that the orators and the 
despots alike have the least power in their cities, as I have stated just now; since 
they do nothing that they wish to do, practically speaking, though they do whatever 
they think to be best” [5]. An alternate translation of the original Greek fragment ἂν 
αὐτοῖς δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι would be “though they do whatever looks better to their 
opinion” [6].
The distinction uses two families of words. With respect to appearance, the pre-
ferred verb is δοκέω (to expect, suppose, imagine, seem). Its family of words includes 
δόξα (expectation, mere opinion, conjecture). On the other hand, with respect to 
what is real, the preferred verb is βούλομαι (will, wish, be willing) [7]. This separation 
between two types of “doing what one wants” mirrors the thorough classifications of 
human endeavors2 in the Gorgias dialog and the distinction between what is apparent 
and what is real. It also includes medicine among the arts of restoring what is true and 
not what is merely apparent.
On the side of doing what looks better for an individual’s opinion (expres-
sions using δοκέω), there are basic practices (ἐμπειρία) that target mere flattery, 
including apparent health. These practices are meant for pleasure, and Plato 
classifies them according to their aim of creating appearances (like sophistry and 
cosmetics) or restoring appearances (like rhetoric and cooking). All four practices 
pretend to deal with health, either in the soul (sophistry and rhetoric) or in the 
body (cooking and cosmetics). Oppositely, doing what one really wants (expres-
sions with βούλομαι) deal with knowledge. They are the arts (τέχναι). Their 
quality resides in the fact that they do not target pleasure but the good. Legislation 
and gymnastics are generators of real health, while justice and medicine are ways 
of restoring real health. Finally, legislation and justice deal with the soul, while 
gymnastics and medicine deal with the body. A previously published table can 
offer more details on this classification [8].
In many parts of Plato’s Dialogs, they make mention about θεραπεία, a term 
which holds meanings like service, attendance, treatment, cure and care [7]. But, 
this term holds strong connections with the whole platonic philosophy about the 
1 Gorgias, 466d-e
2 Gorgias, 462c-469
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betterment of the human being3. “The approach of the ultimately real, in Plato’s 
thought, is properly made by way of his interpretation of man, man whose rational 
existence is in jeopardy, because he is divorced from his ground of Being despite de 
telltale signs of his essential kinship with it” [9].
I argue that platonic θεραπεία is meant to restore wisdom, which can be 
considered as an authentic form of autonomy, based on doing the things a person 
genuinely wants (βούλομαι) and not on things that one finds best in appear-
ance (δόξῃ βέλτιστον εἶναι). This authentic form of autonomy includes the basic 
attitude of care. Plato’s cave is a symbol of the inverted life of man4, who cheer-
fully exchanges shadows for reality, ignorant of himself and of his own bondage. 
For this very condition Plato tries to devise a θεραπεία, a scheme of educating the 
man in adequately coping with it [9].
Now, returning to the field of contemporary medical ethics, we can explore 
new meanings about what it is to care about one’s patient and what their autonomy 
might mean. For a patient, to act in accordance with what they genuinely want, the 
patient should act in line with what is good for them. In a platonic understanding, 
this would be true, because true τέχναι deal with the real health and with authentic 
volition5. If we are to understand autonomy in a platonic way, being autonomous 
implies knowledge about what is genuinely good for oneself and not the freedom to 
do what merely appears to be good.
Did Plato speak about the patient’s freedom to choose? We argue that he did 
but with the appropriate vocabulary of his time and of his philosophy. For Plato, 
freedom to choose is genuinely exerted in the realm of good. The good, as the 
patients understands it at a given moment in time, might not be properly grasped. 
There is always the danger of substitution the true good for the apparent one. And 
one fragment of Alcibiades6 is illustrative in this sense: “Socrates: For if a man, my 
dear Alcibiades, is at liberty to do what he pleases, but is lacking in mind, what is 
the probable result to him personally, or to the state as well? For instance, if he is 
sick and at liberty to do what he pleases, without a medical mind, but with a despot’s 
power, which prevents anyone from even reproving him, what will the result be? 
Will not his health, likely, be shattered?” [10].
From these platonic fragments we draw some valuable information. Not only can 
we map a superposition over the contemporary definition of autonomy (capacity and 
information), but there is also a nuance which deals with what a patient should really 
know and do. So, θεραπεία as care should prepare one to be the type of person who 
is able to genuinely want something that is good for themselves. In short, θεραπεία 
makes one wiser, when and if it is possible. The battle between what a patient genu-
inely wants and what merely seems appropriate is externalized in another example 
of Gorgias7. By a values inversion, those who pursued the patient’s good get blamed: 
“servants you tell me of, and caterers to appetites, fellows who have no proper and 
respectable knowledge of them, and who peradventure will first stuff and fatten 
men’s bodies to the tune of their praises, and then cause them to lose even the flesh 
they had to start with; and these in their turn will be too ignorant to cast the blame 
of their maladies and their loss of original weight upon their regalers, but any people 
who chance to be by at the time and offer them some advice—just when the previous 
stuffing has brought, after the lapse of some time, its train of disease, since it was 
done without regard to what is wholesome, these are the people they will accuse and 
3 p. xvi
4 p. 47
5 Gorgias, 466d-e
6 Alcibiades, 135a
7 518c-d
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chide and harm as far as they can, while they will sing the praises of that former crew 
who caused the mischief” [5].
Does platonic θεραπεία mean caring for the person? I argue that it does. Since8 
“the tragedy of human existence and, therewith, the problem of philosophia as a 
method of education, are signalized in men’s contentment with living an unreal and 
alien life […] the art is not one of conveying truth to man in the form of proposi-
tions, but rather one of conducting men, by exacting scrutiny of opinions, into the 
presence of reality” [9]. What Plato desired for people is, in this sense, unexpect-
edly actual.
Plato’s type of care consisted of enabling people to seize the good and make right 
decisions about it. However, this type of θεραπεία was not the only way of under-
standing the relationship among the patient, illness and choices. Even before Plato, 
the complete care for the person started to be conceptually dismantled. This was 
due, in part, to the Hippocratic tradition, which focused more on the specifics of the 
disease and on the interaction between signs of illness and individual particularities 
in showing these signs9. “The physician must be able to tell the antecedents, who 
know the present and foretell the future—must meditate these things and have two 
special objects in view with regard to diseases, namely, to do good or to do no harm. 
The art consists of three things—the disease, the patient and the physician. The 
physician is the servant of the art, and the patient must combat the disease along 
with the physician” [11]. We can notice that the good this section refers to does 
not seem to have the same meaning as Plato’s good in Gorgias. While Plato’s good 
seems to have more to do with how we should understand autonomy, Hippocrates’s 
good sound like the current-day principle of beneficence. One of them seems more 
preoccupied with servicing the person; the other one is more inclined in servicing 
the profession.
However, in history, medicine was on the brink of losing care altogether. 
Beginning with the spectacular discoveries of the XVIIIth century, the disease, once 
an element of the Hippocratic triad, almost became the sole center of attention. 
And Foucault10 unmasked it: “In the rational space of disease, doctors and patients 
do not occupy a place as of right; they are tolerated as disturbances that can hardly 
be avoided: the paradoxical role of medicine consists, above all, in neutralizing 
them, in maintaining the maximum difference between them, so that, in the void 
that appears between them, the ideal configuration of the disease becomes a con-
crete, free form, totalized at last in a motionless, simultaneous picture, lacking both 
density and secrecy, where recognition opens of itself onto the order of essences” 
[12]. Care, as a patient’s guidance towards the truth, is completely absent, and the 
only truth being sought is the scientific model of the illness itself.
In modern times, some philosophers were able to offer indirect explanations 
about the way in which care got lost on the way. For instance, we can draw some 
insight from the works of Emmanuel Lévinas. Phenomenologically, the philosopher 
shows that the relationship between “I” and “Other” cannot be a mere representa-
tion. A simple perception turns the Other into a mental object. But for a genuine 
understanding of the relationship between I and Other, “I” am forced to accept that 
the phenomenological distance between I and Other is infinite. In short, I cannot 
access their phenomena and experiences. All assertions using “we” are unable to 
circumvent totalization and lose the Other among all the objects of my mind. The 
only process at our disposal is to look towards the Other, to acknowledge the infinite 
distance. If infinity is acknowledged, the relationship with the Other ceases to be a 
8 p. 45
9 Epidemics, Book 1, Sect II, 5. p. 360
10 p. 9
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mere relationship like the one I have with the objects of my mind. Looking towards 
the Other becomes an ethical relationship, and its only honest feature becomes care 
[13]. For current-day medicine, Lévinas’ conclusion is valuable: it shows us that care 
is embedded in the very core of the human relationship. Since Hippocrates made the 
physician the servant of the profession (ὁ ἰητρὸς ὑπηρέτης τῆς τέχνης) and not of the 
Other, the understanding of care gradually changed.
Today, we understand autonomy in terms of agency and ability to choose. But 
what is chosen by patients and communities is in dispute. This is because, in the 
patient-physician relationship, free choice has become an honored process but with 
no moral content. It is a procedural morality, based on the principle of permission, 
but often lacking in content [14]. We hold dear values that allow us to choose, but 
medicine and care have no true insight in what should be chosen as good and for 
whom. Therefore, the process itself of choosing is doubtful since appearance and 
truth can easily switch places. Plato held a view that the patient (on a physical and 
spiritual level) must be accompanied towards the truth and enabled to choose the 
appropriate path; this included healing situations and medicine. Getting back to 
some of these incredibly old insights might trigger a certain degree of reconsidera-
tion of the actual tenets in medical ethics: autonomy, not separated of care, but 
enhanced by care itself might be a provocation worth exploring.
3. Contemporary beneficence and Plato’s holism
Beneficence is another celebrated principle of medical ethics, from the time of 
the Belmont report itself [15]. This principle demands doctors and researchers to 
make an active contribution to the welfare of patients. In the common morality, 
it includes obligations11 of persons like protecting the rights of others, preventing 
harm from occurring to others, remove conditions that cause harm to others, help 
persons with disabilities and rescue those in danger [3]. In contemporary medical 
practice, many efforts have been directed towards what we call Evidence Based 
Medicine, a methodic approach that aims to validate or to invalidate separate inter-
ventions for separate pathologies. The process is meant to guarantee the beneficial 
effect of medical interventions. However, many professionals feel that this type of 
partitioning in medical knowledge misses the very art of healing and loses touch 
with the human patient [2].
This is where the holistic approach comes into discussion. The word’s etymology 
is self-explanatory. It comes from the Ancient Greek term ὅλος, -η, -ον, meaning 
whole, entire, utter [7]. A contemporary definition of “holism” states that it is “the 
theory that certain wholes are greater than the sum of their parts, the opposite of 
atomism. In medicine, it is the treating of the whole person, rather than just the 
symptoms of a disease” [16]. We can notice in the above definition two elements. 
The first one deals with the whole as superior to a mere sum of parts. The second one 
speaks specifically about the entirety of the human being in medical thinking. On 
the opposite side, the term “atomism” means “a theoretical approach that regards 
something as interpretable through analysis into distinct, separable, and indepen-
dent elementary components, the opposite of holism” [16].
Although contemporary medicine seems to lean towards atomist thinking, Plato 
held a more holistic view about what was beneficial for a person or a community. 
This view was still popular in his time and culture. Setting aside the enormous 
differences in medical scientific knowledge between current day practices and the 
medicine in the 5th and 4th centuries, the philosophy Plato held about the human 
11 p. 204
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being was intriguing. We argue that many passages in the Dialogs demonstrate 
a holistic approach. For instance, in Charmides12, Plato shows us the important 
relationship between the part and the whole. In order to cure Charmides’ headache, 
Socrates states that one cannot look for a cure destined to the part without a cure for 
the whole: “This Thracian said that the Greeks were right in advising as I told you 
just now: “but Zalmoxis,” he said, “our king, who is a god, says that as you ought not 
to attempt to cure eyes without a head, or a head without body, so you should not 
treat a body without a soul”; and this was the reason why most maladies evaded the 
physicians of Greece—that they neglected the whole, on which they ought to spend 
their pains, for if this were out of order, it would have been impossible for the part 
to be in order” [10].
In the Republic13 Plato mentions a connecting order with respect to parts of the 
soul and parts of the body. This is illustrative for holism in platonic thinking: “But, 
to produce health is to establish the elements in a body in the natural relation of 
dominating and being dominated by one another, while to cause disease is to bring 
it about that one rules or is ruled by the other, contrary to nature. - Yes, that is so. - 
And is it not likewise the production of justice in the soul to establish its principles 
in the natural relation of controlling and being controlled by one another, while 
injustice is to cause the one to rule or be ruled by the other, contrary to nature? - 
Exactly so, he said. - Virtue, then, as it seems, would be a kind of health” [17] .
In the Laws14, Plato teaches about different global lifestyles, suggesting that 
disease and lack of virtue are somehow connected: “The lives of us men must all be 
regarded as naturally bound up in these feelings, and what kinds of lives we natu-
rally desire is what we must distinguish, but if we assert that we desire anything 
else, we only say so through ignorance and inexperience of the lives as they really 
are. What, then, and how many are the lives in which a man—when he has chosen 
the desirable and voluntary in preference to the undesirable and the involuntary, 
and has made it into a private law for himself, by choosing what is at once both 
congenial and pleasant and most good and noble—may live as happily as man can? 
Let us pronounce that one of them is the temperate life, one the wise, one the brave, 
and let us class the healthy life as one; and to these let us oppose four others—the 
foolish, the cowardly, the licentious and the diseased” [18].
We can see that, in Plato’s view, healing was almost never meant to be some 
isolated intervention. We can also notice that, partially, Plato did not hold the views 
of ancient religious medicine which connected all health states with maleficent 
spirits [1]. Plato shows that one could not heal the part without healing the whole. 
This was the case for body parts, soul parts or city parts. We argue elsewhere that 
Plato’s obvious holistic approach can entirely change the semantics of what we 
understand by “patient” in the Dialogs [19]. On the other hand, what constitutes 
health and justice is an appropriate order or hierarchy of those parts that constitute 
the whole to be healed. Las but not least, health and virtue go hand in hand: one 
cannot expect to restore health without restoring virtue in the entire individual.
This cultural DNA string did not begin with Plato and did not disappear entirely 
in the following centuries. We could say it “traveled” in parallel with a more atomist 
approach, for a long time until it almost got lost in the XVIIIth century. We start our 
argument by mentioning the millennium that passed between the documentary 
attesting of doctors in Egypt and the doctors’ attestation in Greece. The Egyptians 
are the first to speak about surgery around 1550 B.C. [1]. We can consider this 
moment as the first known separation between a more “rational” and atomist 
12 156d-e
13 444d
14 733d-e
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approach of the human being and the magic-religious medicine that held exclusive 
ground until then. This first rupture marks different attitudes towards man as a 
whole and as a sum of reparable parts.
The Greeks took on this task of separation. The reputation of Hippocrates as 
the father of medicine comes, especially, from the majority who currently prac-
tices a “scientific” medicine. This type of approach systematically studies compo-
nents of the human body. For instance, we speak today about gastroenterology, 
cardiology, nephrology and so on. Indeed, there are numerous physical explana-
tions in Hippocrates’s works. However, he and his followers were not alienated 
from the whole-part relationship. They did not totally abandon the global explana-
tions either. For instance, there are examples15 where astronomical explanations 
leaned towards some kind of religious or magic effect: “One ought to also be 
guarded about the rising of the stars, especially of the Dogstar, then of Arcturus, 
and then the setting of the Pleiades; for diseases are especially apt to prove critical 
in those days, and some prove fatal, some pass off, and all others change to another 
form and another constitution. So it is with regard to them” [11].
However, the Hippocratic doctrine gives a secondary place when it comes to 
holistic approaches, frequently preferring an atomist explanation. The most impor-
tant feature of these teachings makes room for the doctrine of the four humors: 
phlegm, yellow bile, black bile and blood. Many diagnostics16 turn to this way 
of thinking: “That vomiting is of most service which consists of phlegm and bile 
mixed together, and neither very thick nor in great quantity; but those vomitings, 
which are more unmixed, are worse. But if that which is vomited be of the color of 
leeks, or livid, or black, whatever of these colors it be, it is to be reckoned bad; but if 
the same man vomits all these colors, a very fatal symptom is to be reckoned. But of 
all the vomitings, the livid indicates the most imminent danger of death, provided 
it is of a fetid smell. But all the smells, which are somewhat putrid and fetid, are bad 
in all vomitings” [11]. This direction of medicine, seeking physical or “naturalistic” 
explanations for disease will make history and will lead, in time, to present-day 
scientific medicine.
Later, Avicenna will still use holistic notions. The humors doctrine will continue 
to hold an important place but will be frequently connected to the person’s entire 
demeanor17: “One must not get the idea that every temperament gives rise to its 
like and never its opposite. A temperament often gives rise to its exact opposite, 
indirectly (of course); it cannot do so directly. A cold and dry temperament may 
give rise to visible moisture, though this would not be beneficial but would indicate 
that the digestion is feeble. A person with such a temperament would be thin, with 
supple joints, and hairless skin, cold to the touch, the surface veins narrow, and he 
would be gentle and timid in nature” [20].
The contemporary philosophy will succeed in demasking the total transforma-
tion of an individual in an object of observation. This phenomenon started in the 
18th century. Michel Foucault explains18 that the language of things started to be 
authorized with respect to humans as well: “The task lay with this language of 
things, and perhaps with it alone, to authorize knowledge of the individual that 
was not simply of a historic or esthetic order. That the definition of the individual 
should be an endless labor was no longer an obstacle to an experience, which, by 
accepting its own limits, extended its task into the infinite. By acquiring the status 
of object, its particular quality, its impalpable color, and its unique, transitory form 
15 Air, Waters and Places, 11 (p. 205)
16 Prognostics, 13 (p. 245)
17 107, III (pp. 90-91)
18 p. xiv
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took on weight and solidity. No light could now dissolve them in ideal truths, but 
the gaze directed upon them would, in turn, awaken them and make them stand 
out against a background of objectivity. The gaze is no longer reductive; it is, rather, 
that which establishes the individual in his irreducible quality. And thus, it becomes 
possible to organize a rational language around it” [12]. The almost complete 
deterioration of the holistic attitude came to be as a natural consequence of another 
limiting principle: the separation of sciences and the separation of disciplines of 
study. Inside a certain discipline, the rules got more constraining. The production 
of discourses to cover global or holistic attitudes became an almost impossible 
task [21].
It is Gadamer19 that links us back with Plato with respect to medicine. He shows 
that Plato tried to find the connections that tie the spheres of the soul, the city and 
the Universe as a whole. This type of awareness must be regarded as a superior type 
of wisdom compared with the arrogance inspired by our ever-expanding technical 
skills. The German philosopher denounces a crisis of humanity: we developed the 
technical aptitudes in such an extent, so they became an all-encompassing attitude 
[22]. Gadamer shows that doctors are, by virtue of their profession, involved with 
two key aspects of our life: life and death. Plato has shown us that is impossible to 
cure the body without knowing something about the soul. Or, more precisely, one 
cannot heal without knowing something about the nature of the whole. The notion 
of the “whole”, here, does not mean a mere methodological concept. It speaks about 
the unity of being itself20. “It is the whole in the sense of the movement of the stars 
above and the changes of weather below, the rise and fall of the oceans and living 
nature of the woods and fields. It is what surrounds and encompasses the nature of 
human beings that determines whether they find themselves in a condition of safe 
health or exposed to dangerous threats. Medicine seems to be a genuinely universal 
science, especially if this whole of nature is extended to include the whole that is 
our social world” [22].
Nowadays, we understand medical beneficence in terms of functionality, 
mobility, absence of suffering, alleviation of symptoms and removal of organic 
causes. But it is obvious that many medical acts fail to restore true health in an 
individual. The doubt in the physician-patient relationship, the psychiatric comor-
bidities, the side effects of various treatments, the lack of compliance in diet and 
lifestyle and the changes in a patient’s social network often make healing impos-
sible. Philosophy teaches us that holism has survived for a long period of time in 
medicine, despite less scientific medical knowledge in the past centuries. But its 
presence was not a mere artifact of a primitive world. It was strongly connected 
with the intent of a genuine beneficence. Plato believed that healing occurs in the 
whole of an individual and even in the whole of society itself.
4. Concrete ideas for contemporary medical ethics
We argue that Plato may help us reconsider contemporary medical ethics in two 
ways at least. First, useful input might come by revisiting the respect for autonomy. 
Nowadays, respecting a patient’s autonomy includes making sure there is decisional 
capacity, agency, reasonable information, lack of coercion and all conditions for a 
meaningful deliberation between options. Plato taught us that “doing what seems 
best” and “doing what one really wants” are two different ways of acting. And what 
separates them is a will being directed towards the good, in contrast with a false 
19 pp. 84-85
20 p. 115
9Plato in Contemporary Medical Ethics: Holism and Care
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5772/intechopen.93889
sense of choice in doing what looks best to one’s opinion (δόξα). However, the will is 
directed towards the good when and only when one’s character allows it to.
In a platonic reading, an autonomous choice is a wise choice. To the extreme, 
we might argue that some implicit definition of beneficence is present in the very 
substance of the wise choice. Doing what seems best and not what is good for 
oneself is not an exercise of wisdom, thus not an autonomous choice in the new 
semantics of this term. Even when all reasonable information is provided, a lack of 
virtuous character might prevent a potential patient from seeing what is genuinely 
good for oneself, thus invalidating what should have been a wise choice. Therefore, 
the question arises if respect for autonomy as we understand it nowadays is, indeed, 
sufficient for a competent (i.e. wise) decision.
The closest medical practice to this ideal would be the deliberative model of 
the patient-physician relationship. In contrast with paternalistic and informative 
models, in this type of relationship, the objective of the physician-patient interaction 
is to help the patient determine and choose the best health-related values that can 
be realized in that situation. The physician helps identify the values included in the 
available options but also suggests why certain health-related values are worthier of 
consideration. However, in this model, the physician discusses only health-related 
values and considers that many other values are unrelated to health and disease. The 
deliberative model allows the doctor to act as a teacher or friend who sees respect for 
autonomy as moral self-development. Objections to this model include the fact that 
physicians would not possess privileged knowledge of those values which should 
have priority in health situations. This objection is intimately linked to the pluralistic 
moral reality of modern societies. Other objections emphasize the fact that the 
physician should never engage in moral deliberation or that this type of endeavor 
might easily turn into unintended paternalism [23].
However, Plato offers us more. And it is not mandatory to adopt his theory of 
Forms or his ideas about learning as remembering to figure out that people can 
be accompanied towards more truth and better choices. Cushman explains to us 
what Plato means by his theory of αναμνέσις21: “however valid true opinion may be, 
επιστήμη requires a community of kindred minds, wherein truth is jointly acknowl-
edged and so, is removed from the closet of merely private surmise” [9]. In leading 
the other towards the truth, it is never a matter of coercion. Opinions arise in the 
individual soul, and it is by friction with other minds, that these become converted 
into matters of knowledge22 [9].
The deliberative model allows the patient and doctor to discuss the worthiness of 
different health-related values. It also aspires to a certain moral self-development in 
a patient. These features match the message in the platonic dialogs. However, critics 
of this model argue that physicians do not possess privileged knowledge of values 
which should have priority in health situations. Inspired by Plato, I argue that they 
should possess this privileged knowledge. A certain type of wisdom should be a part 
of their build as doctors. This is especially true because, as Cushman explains23, one 
is unable to share the perspective of his own virtue unless they are in possession 
of true knowledge as an integrating part of their virtuous character [9]. In short, 
a physician would do his job properly when they are able to help a patient become 
wiser. In a platonic reading, we equate true autonomy to wisdom. Therefore, to help 
patients become wiser, the physicians themselves should have a virtuous character. 
The only way a doctor can respect patient’s true autonomy is for this doctor to be wise 
himself/herself.
21 p. 93
22 p. 103
23 p. 93
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Critics might argue that the definition of good is, often, a political one. They are 
right. But the platonic reconsideration of the doctor-patient relationship in terms of 
wisdom is not meant to violate the principle of permission. This principle remains 
the sine qua non condition of a peaceable secular community [14]. I argue that 
doctors have a duty to try, to the best of their ability, to stir a moral (not religious) 
development in their patients, as the only way to enable true autonomy. To do that, 
doctors have a duty to stir moral development in themselves. They cannot escape 
the essential universality of medical science Gadamer24 speaks about [22]. If we are 
to believe Plato, failure to accomplish either of the two duties is, in fact, failure to 
respect the principle of autonomy. It becomes a “blind leading the blind” situation.
Secondly, Plato helps us rethink beneficence in more holistic terms. What is 
beneficial in a medical act should be beneficial for the entire human being but also 
for the entire community of beings. The over-specialization of medicine has helped 
scientists to expand knowledge and discover new and revolutionary treatments. 
However, I argue that, when it comes to medical practice, this partitioning of 
medical interventions represents a high risk of doing more harm than good. Patients 
often lack treatment compliance. They are, often, unable to change their lifestyle 
to make a treatment work or to avoid complications. What is mended by a medical 
specialty often gets broken by behaviors outside the medical area of expertise. It 
is the case with smoking, drug abuse or generally unhealthy behaviors. Multiple 
comorbidities get treated by separate specialists, with different protocols. They 
often result in a high number of drugs getting ingested daily. Similarly, depression 
is usually accompanied by lack of interest in one’s health and self-care behaviors. 
Psychosocial problems and difficulties are both causes and effects of depression and 
anxiety. Moreover, poverty, lack of education, different forms of discrimination and 
abuse towards minorities, all diminish or altogether block access to healthcare.
A more holistic approach should be able to put together the pieces of this 
medical, social, behavioral and spiritual puzzle. The nexus of information about 
disease, lifestyle, behaviors, genetics, social status, economic status and so on might 
be in the hands of the general practitioner in their role as the family doctor. They 
might be the most suitable physician to take on the difficult task of accompanying 
patients on their way to true, better lives. Besides technical skills, the family doctor 
might be particularly trained in deliberating values and shared decision making. 
They should be able to have a good understanding of spiritual, social, economic 
and educational aspects of life. This will enable them to direct the use medical and 
non-medical resources to empower patients to make beneficial decisions in the web 
of all medical specialties and non-medical realities. This would also give a special 
place to psychotherapies as a resource that might favor life-changing personal 
leaps. In short, multidisciplinary approaches cannot and should not become the 
patient’s task. The reason for it is that the patient is not able to build the holistic 
approach needed for their care on their own. The task of approaching things 
holistically should be in the hands of a doctor. This doctor is not required to be 
over-specialized in some areas of the human body. They are expected to be a wise 
mentor in the health of the human being.
5. Conclusions
The advancements in medical ethics and bioethics allow for more precise useful 
frameworks to judge different ethical dilemmas and questions. These frameworks 
are also easier to include in codes and regulations pertaining to the medical 
24 p. 115
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profession. However, it is still not clear what exactly an autonomous patient does 
when making a health-related choice. Nor it is clear what the moral content of 
beneficence is, since the patient is a whole in themselves and is part of a larger 
system of relationships and interactions. I have shown that Plato, twenty-four 
centuries ago, spoke about a type of choice that we can construe, today, as genuine 
autonomy. This type of choice has been cultivated inside a relationship of care 
between the doctor and the patient. The philosophy of care about one’s genuine 
want of something good for oneself has traveled the history. It almost got lost once 
disease (and not the ill human) became the central focus of the medical profession. 
Plato also harbored a holistic approach about people and their illnesses. This holistic 
approach was present before him and survived after him, in parallel with an atomist 
view that began with the first Egyptian surgical attempts. Holism was almost com-
pletely lost in the 18th century. Recovering both holism and care is an endeavor that 
might dramatically change the way medicine is practiced but also the moral choices 
it implies. Empowering a patient for an autonomous choice means caring about 
them making a wise choice. Healing is not due to parts but to the whole of patients, 
communities and to the environment. It seems that Plato had this type of wisdom. 
We might want to recover something our Western culture had back at its roots. This 
content was lost once the scientific revolution promoted partitioned technical skills 
and reductive formulas of autonomy.
© 2020 The Author(s). Licensee IntechOpen. This chapter is distributed under the terms 
of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, 
provided the original work is properly cited. 
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